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Abstract
Natural disasters, power cuts and fires do not
discriminate, but they happen to both private and
public organizations. Prior literature has agreed that
business continuity management (BCM) requires
commitment from all levels of an organization.
However, the roles of different internal and external
stakeholders in BCM practices has not been discussed
in prior literature. This study focuses on BCM
stakeholders in continuity practices in the public
sector. We report the results of a qualitative case study
with 16 interviews. The support from senior
management was wanted, IT experts were valued, the
role of users was not deemed important, and external
service providers were trusted partners but also
considered “the biggest headaches” by the interviewed
managers.
1. Introduction
“Since we do not have large interruptions, the
[department heads] just assume that [continuity] is an
issue someone else manages, and it works, so why
should they [care]. Just like water comes from the tap,
it just does.” - Interviewee
Engaging employees and managers in business
continuity is probably as hard as motivating people to
see the importance of information security; unless
some incident happens, they do not care. Serious
disruptions in IT services tend to catch the attention of
senior management, since disruptions might lead to
substantial reputational damage and have business
impacts [21, 30]. Therefore, many companies
nowadays consider business continuity a critical IT
issue along with information security issues [18].
Business impacts of risks are used in prioritizing
critical systems and processes, and based on those
analyses, the business continuity management (BCM)
proactively prepares and aims to avoid possible
incidents in organizations [15] Also public sector uses
BCM to avoid operational interruptions [17, 35].
Prior research has concluded that embedding BCM
into organizations requires engagement from internal
and external stakeholders [15, 16]. In private
companies, we have seen that continuity culture of an
organization improves the embeddedness of BCM [29]
and we know that technical experts create the
continuity of digital infrastructures [24]. Thus, it would
be interesting to understand the role of different stake-
holders in BCM of IT services also in the public sector.
Managers responsible for BCM have a central view
to the BCM area and can encourage the involvement of
stakeholders. Understanding their perspective could
thus lead us to see how BCM could be embedded in the
whole organization. Hence, this paper extends the prior
literature by focusing on how managers responsible for
BCM see the roles of different stakeholders in BCM
practices in the public sector?
This paper reports the findings from interviews of
16 public sector organizations in Finland.  We identify
five different stakeholder groups, top and middle
management, IT experts, users and external service
providers, which have varied roles in BCM practices.
2. Business continuity management
Prior research in information security (ISsec) and
information systems has recognized that one of its aims
is to ensure business continuity [8, 11]. There are a
number of risks related to information systems and
information communications and technology (ICT),
and business impact analysis of critical processes and
IT resources can help to prevent interruptions [28].
Operational interruptions may occur due to many
reasons: natural disasters [19], epidemic diseases
affecting human resources [33], ISsec incidents [9],
technical break downs etc.
BCM aims to proactively avoid operational
interruptions in critical business processes with socio-
technical solutions [15]. Disaster recovery and business
continuity planning studies have presented several
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ways to technically avoid or mitigate interruptions [6,
14]. Back-ups, infrastructure and facility redundancy
have been found important [34] while disaster
identification, preparedness and an organizational
recovery team further ensure operational recovery [31].
Several business continuity planning methods
emphasize business impact analysis, planning, testing,
training  employees and the cyclic nature of planning
to improve organizational resilience [22].
Since the aim is to ensure the continuity of business
operations, the business focus and organization-wide
perspective of BCM is significant, in contrast to mere
IS perspective [3]. Therefore, it is essential that senior
management takes responsibility of BCM [9, 17].
Butler and Gray [5] have emphasized that reliable IS
requires routines and mindful behavior on operational
and management levels as well as in system design.
Embedded processes and practicing of continuity are
central along with traditional technical solutions [23].
Business continuity has been recognized valuable
for organizations also in other disciplines; resilience,
robustness and disruption management have been
studied e.g. in supply chain management [27] societal
safety [13], economic resilience of areas [4]. The
survival of private and public organizations after
natural and man-made crises has been discussed also in
the crisis and emergency management field [2, 7].
Prior literature has reported BCM problems in
public sector [1], and earlier some concerns have been
raised for public sector BCM such as senior
management not implementing appropriate continuity
risk analyses [35], not having sufficient continuity
controls for ICT [20] or not creating business
continuity plans [32]. After major natural disasters, the
interest in continuity issues seems to increase in the
public sector [26]. Yet, the prior research on public
sector BCM has not discussed the role of different
stakeholders in BCM to the best of our knowledge.
It has been noticed that when IT management
initiates organizational BCM, the commitment of other
stakeholders is not guaranteed [25]. The embeddedness
of BCM practices and their impact seem to be
connected and the senior management commitment
drives the BCM implementation in organizations [17].
In fact, if senior management is not aware and
controlling BCM, then the consequences for instance
in hacking situations may be severe [9]. Embeddedness
and continuity culture can be created with BCM
practices [29], but how are different stakeholder groups
involved in these practices has not been studied in the
public sector. A comprehensive stakeholder
perspective is also missing from private sector
although scattered results focusing on the part of senior
and IT management in BCM as well as service
providers exist [15, 16, 36].
3. Research approach and context
In order to study stakeholders and BCM practices
in the public sector, we decided to take a qualitative
case study approach. We decided to aim for maximum
variation in sampling [10] and find diverse public
sector organizations from the state, provincial and local
level in Finland. We sought the web sites of different
organizations for contact details of IT managers, who
might be knowledgeable in BCM. All interviewees
were approached with personalized emails including
high-level interview themes by two researchers.
Table 1. Interviewees and their organizations.
Organisation
type
Personnel in
whole
organisation
IT-
staff
Interviewee
A Governmental
organisation
200 7 CIO
B Governmental
organisation
520 N/A Leading
expert
C Governmental
organisation
5500 150 ISsec
manager
D Governmental
organisation
6000 500 CIO
E Municipality 500 4 IT manager
F Municipality 900 6 IT operations
manager
G Municipality 950 4 IT manager
H Municipality 1500 10 CIO
I Higher
education
institution
520 * 16 CIO
J Higher
education
institution
1200 * 30 + CIO and
system
maintenance
manager
K Higher
education
institution
3000 * 250 ISsec
manager
L Higher
education
institution
3500 * 75 ISsec
manager
M Service
organisation
330 N/A ISsec
manager
N Service
organisation
7000 N/A CIO
O Research
organisation
560 N/A IT manager
P Research
organisation
750 N/A Group
manager
* including staff, but excluding students
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From the state level, we chose different
governmental, state-funded research and service
organizations. From the provincial level, we chose
different universities or polytechnics representing
higher education institutions and from the local level,
we targeted municipalities. We were able to get 16
interviews, one with two interviewees (see details in
Table 1).
The variation of BCM practices was wide in the
data set. There were three organizations, which had
very mature BCM practices with 24/7 operations, data
centers in several locations, highly interested top
management, regularly updated continuity and
recovery plans for all systems and regular testing
schedules. Other organizations had almost all quite
robust technical BCM approaches and crisis
communication, but the interviewees reported either
lack of BCM awareness among top or middle
management or partial or non-existent continuity plans
or testing practices.
Table 2 presents the data structure and coding
scheme created based on the analysis. The analysis
began by reading the transcripts thoroughly, but open
mindedly, to get a sense of the complete set. Some
narratives started to catch the reader’s attention, a
general recurring theme seemed to be an awareness or
cognition of some ideal state of continuity, which had
not been achieved by most organizations, but to which
many interviewees still compared their organization.
First, the author started to color code the texts into
“issues that had not been done” (compared with the
ideal state) and “issues that were well done”. Another
recurring theme was actor related issues and situation
descriptions. All of these were carefully marked to a
visual mindmap tool (XMind), and then reorganized
into some themes and more detailed concepts behind
aggregated categories of “Not done”, “Well done”,
“Descriptions”. However, after initial analysis, similar
themes emerged on both sides (Not/well done) and the
original categorization was reorganized.
After combining the “not done” and “well done”
categories, it started to become clear that interviewees
were concerned not only with several stakeholders, and
practices, but also technical issues and legal issues
(which are now out of the scope of this paper).
Therefore, the author focused on finding the passages
and codes related to stakeholders and practices from
the analysis mindmap. The codes were then
reorganized to five different stakeholder groups, and
three practices, which emerged from the data.
Table 2. Coding scheme of the data set.
Coding sample Codes Themes Interesting
issues
“… we have monthly [reporting]. We have an internal ISsec forum,
where we have the related key persons from management. [To] top
management, now it goes via IT manager. So those issues, s/he sees
necessary to bring to awareness of top management, s/he does
[present in senior management group].” [C, p.10]
Support Top
management
Stakeholders
“continuity and ISsec related [return on investment] calculations are
really difficult to do [for top management].” [E, p.10]
Problems
“We have the [IT] production steering group once a week, so big
ones and small ones, one could say that all interruptions are
[discussed] there.”[M, p.10]
Task force Middle
management
“Since we do not have large interruptions, the [department heads]
just assume that [continuity] is an issue someone else manages, and
it works, so why should they [care].” [C, p.11]
Lack of
awareness
“On-call duty team […] has a quite high skill requirement to be
accepted in, since one has to be able to absorb new information.”
[L, p.12]
Teams Experts
“Since we have a small and established team, so we haven’t even
done, and there isn’t any […] detailed plan, but everybody knows
what has to be done.” [J, p.7]
Instead of
detailed
plans
“There must be countless number of services of which we probably
do not know – and those are used by a smaller group, who have
organized the services for themselves ... users just use whatever
they like.” [J, p.3]
Awareness Users
“When the e-prescription project started, it [e-training] was
obligatory for all in the social and healthcare sector to pass before
they could use the system.” [F, p.11]
Training
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“We have taken this farthest with this certain service provider, we
have practiced it with more than a decade, so once every four years
we ask for new tenders and we always improve [the continuity
requirements in the contract] and the process.” [I, p.4]
Contracts External service
providers
“We cannot afford a server expert, since there would not be enough
tasks for him all the time, only when there is a fault.” [G, p.5]
Reasons to
use
“When we have several providers, and everyone informs us that
they have checked their area and there was not any problems there.
And the situation still is that somewhere is a problem. So that is the
biggest headache of a service integrator, how to handle that.” [C,
p.8]
Problems
“No, about information [systems]. But we have, have done a risk
analysis on the organizational level. But related to information
management.” [G, p.9]
Risk
analyses
Planning Practices
“[Service] provider most often is this [governmental office] and
then we have those commercial providers. They do the plans, which
system owner then approves.” [A, p.4]
Continuity
plans
“Every year we agree on certain objects to be checked, and this
back-up process has been one, not annually, but once in a while we
have tested it, and certain other components we have went through.”
[O, p.5]
Partial
testing
Testing
“Not in that sense, we have not tested them, like we would turn the
big handle in the data center - without any warning power would be
cut off from one data center and then we would see how it turns out.
Well, once in a disruption situation when a UPS broke in a
room.”[P, p. 5]
Full
testing
“Actually, Facebook once used with this, since Our
Communications [department] uses Facebook, because they
informed that [service provider]’s data center had an incident. It was
of course a little bit poor message in Facebook, since the [provider]
did not necessary want to be mentioned.” [K, p.9]
In
disruption
situations
Communi-
cation
4. Findings and discussion
4.1 Stakeholders
In prior literature, managers are considered
important for BCM [9, 17]. In our study, IT
management also discussed the role of top and middle
management, experts, users and external service
providers. After all, many organizations had
outsourced fully or partially their IT services.
Commitment of top management was valuable for
IT managers. This was apparent in the interviews,
when top managers required regular BCM reporting
and the reports were actually not only a formality, but
studied too.
“[The reports] are not just for reading, but s/he
actually reads them and asks questions [about them].”
[M, p.15]
If top management did not require regular reporting
or continuity planning, then interviewees wondered
whether management understood the importance of IT
service continuity.
“It is obvious that in this kind of a hierarchical
organization where there is a general director, and
then departmental directors […] that of course those
issues, the general director sees as important and
current, those issues s/he will delegate to her/his
subordinates.” [C, p.11]
The support from top management was therefore
considered vital for organizational commitment, and
“selling” of this BCM agenda was sometimes
necessary in order to gain the support.
Another stakeholder group was the middle
management. Sometimes regular reporting was
targeted for a special IT or ISsec task force consisting
of middle management, and top management was
informed only when the chairperson of the task force
considered it meaningful. This kind of discussion
forum supporting decision-making seemed essential for
IT managers, since if some organization lacked a task
force, the manager had to make decisions and fight the
organizational windmills single-handedly for
resources.
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The middle managers sometimes were not aware of
the significance of BCM. Some interviewee had
noticed that department heads had the notion that
continuity was the responsibility of “someone else”,
since the systems seemed to be working and in
disruption situations, IT department carried out the
operational recovery. Another interviewee had even
tried to create SLAs with other departments, which did
not want to take responsibility for prioritizing systems
based on criticality or costs of continuous IT
operations.
The role of middle management was varied in
organizations. Based on the data set, other IT managers
considered the middle managers as valuable
companions in the taskforces. Others had to survive by
themselves and give equal service to all departments
since the middle management did not care for
continuity issues.
Another important group was the experts, who were
considered being “top-of-the-line professionals” [L,
p.7] and sometimes were used as auditors for external
suppliers, since many had auditor qualifications (CISA
etc.). When the experts had long experience from the
same organization, they were so reliable that some
even considered continuity plans unnecessary, because
the expert team knew their job so well. They were also
committed, one interviewee told about an incident
when the air conditioning of a data center broke down
and the spare parts came from Denmark with some
delay. During the delay, they organized operations
manually, requiring manual labor every morning and
evening during the weekend. Although the IT team
normally operated 8 hours on weekdays, the team still
came every morning and evening to help their manager
to ensure IT operations for those 5 days.
However, since some organizations were in the
middle of an outsourcing process, they had some
concerns about whether the same kind of service
quality could be maintained after their experts had
been moved to the service provider.
“It has been based on that the people really well
know what they are doing. On their expertise. But in
the future, the maintaining people might not know [the
systems] in a similar way [for example] that one
cannot pull that cord.” [O, p.9]
A knowledgeable IT team was valuable and the
reliability of the external service provider was
questionable at least, since this organization was just in
the middle of outsourcing their IT services. To
summarize, expertise was respected and it seemed that
all interviewees trusted their IT teams, and they took
the personnel risk so seriously that they had “stuntmen
and women” for key people, so the operations would
not be disrupted because of holidays or illnesses.
Users were mentioned as the fourth stakeholder
group. Since many of the interviewees were also
responsible for ISsec, the familiar “user is the weakest
link” argument was used. A normal user probably had
no idea of continuity management, if they had not been
involved in BCM planning, but “the others are perhaps
somehow aware of the [continuity] issue, it is like any
other issue, which is not part of my tasks.” [C, p.10]
Most organizations had conducted ISsec training
online or otherwise, and they required staff to sign
ISsec policies and sometimes their supervisors even
tested their ISsec knowledge. However, apart from the
top three organizations, the organizations struggled
with how basic users should be trained in BCM issues.
In the less mature organizations, interviewees were
certain that their technical monitoring of devices (by
service providers or by themselves) was sufficient for
continuity management and no particular training to
increase continuity awareness was required.
The “top” organizations had a clear incident
reporting system for normal users in place “[They
report] to their supervisor or his/her supervisor, […]
or use centralized reporting, which goes automatically
to our ISsec team.” [D, p.11]. In the other
organizations, the helpdesk treated the user reported
incidents or transferred them to experts. One
organization provided a 40-50 page online document
for all users to explain all alternative processes and
systems for service failure situations. Another
organization also monitored the network traffic
constantly and every year caught an employee doing
some forbidden activity. This kind of monitoring was
not possible for instance in higher education
institutions, where staff had versatile research areas
and required access everywhere.
Users as a stakeholder group were discussed in
rather indifferent tone; they were not really important
to be informed about continuity and technical
equipment alarmed experts when needed even without
user reports. This is contradictory to prior research,
which encourages general awareness and
embeddedness of continuity issues throughout the
organization [29].
External service providers, the fifth stakeholder
group, were a central concern of almost all interviews,
more so than any other group, probably because the
organizations had either fully or partially outsourced
their IT services. Reason for outsourcing was related to
lack of expertise and resources in their own
organization: “When the old environment was at the
end of its lifecycle, […] we got an offer from [local
public service provider], […] they would provide the
service, build the environment and had pricing options
for smaller to large organizations. […] The price was
so [low] that we had to look at it twice to believe it
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[…] and they would provide service 24/7.” [G, p.4]
Many public organizations operate with limited
funding and when people have retired, they have not
hired replacements. In this kind of scenario, it is a
sound decision to outsource IT services, if it is possible
to get expertise with a minimal cost from a specialized
service provider.
Many smaller organizations accepted standard
contract terms for outsourcing since they did not have
more power to gain better terms. If they asked for
sanctions for service level agreement (SLA) breaches,
the prices would increase significantly, so most
organizations did not ask for them. One interviewee
told about a major storm that affected power
distribution in the whole southern Finland. The
interviewee worked in a small organization and had
bought in advance some extra maintenance hours
(guaranteed fixing of a problem in 8 hours) from a
network operator as a precaution and decided to use
those hours for the storm damages. However, the
operator would not allow using those hours, since they
had to ensure network services for larger organizations
first: “They didn’t care for [the contract] at all. They
just would not fix it. […] Even if they hadn’t prepared
for [the storm] and their resources were not enough,
so they thought ‘ok, there will be some yelling later,
but do we want some yelling from Hospital X or the
Small organization’. So of course they think that the
small organization does not matter.”[E, p.7] After this
incident, the smaller organization decided to start
network cooperation with a larger organization in the
same area, so together they would have better
bargaining power with the network operator.
Organizations often had requirements for continuity
in SLAs and ISsec requirements were considered
critical by some organizations. However, one
interviewee pointed out that all of their contracts had
force major terms, so 100% reliability was not a
possibility. Some organizations did not have any exit
plans, for possible problems with the service provider,
some had two providers for most critical services. They
did audits for the service providers or at least had
started to make them and aimed to do them always for
new providers. Many providers automatically
monitored their clients’ services and fixed them before
any problems were visible at the client end. Still, some
interviewees indicated that their role as an IT service
integrator was difficult when many components of
certain systems were outsourced to various providers.
During service interruptions, it often happened that all
service providers were confident that their services
were running correctly, but the problem still persisted.
Then interviewees had to organize all the providers
into the same negotiation table to solve the situation,
which was time-consuming.
From continuity perspective, the organizations had
good service from their service providers, but not so
much negotiation power, which then affected major
incident management. But service providers seemed
trustworthy partners based on their experiences. The
general tone of voice regarding service provider
activities was mostly neutral or even positive in the
interviews.
4.2 Stakeholder roles in continuity practices
Interviewees discussed five stakeholder groups: top
and middle management, IT experts, users and external
service providers. We identified several BCM
practices: risk analyzing, continuity planning, testing,
training, reporting and communicating in crisis
situations.
Continuity planning was discussed extensively
during interviews and first phase of planning in BCM
is business impact analysis or risk analysis [12]. In
some organizations, IT department had done risk
analyses by themselves and some not so systematically
or at all, for example, if a general risk assessment had
been done on the organizational level. “Yes, [in the
document template] if I remember right, is some kind
of heading for risks, but it has not been for example
done with any particular risk method.” [L, p.9].
Organizational input to risk analysis was rarely
mentioned in the interviews. So it seems that the only
stakeholders interested in BCM risk analysis were the
IT experts themselves.
There was a lot of variation in continuity plans and
planning. Some lacked BCM plans, since they had a
good IT team, or used their current resources in some
other project like mapping of the enterprise
architecture. Several interviewees stated that they had
disaster recovery plans or legally required
preparedness plans instead of continuity plans. Some
had extensive system documentation otherwise, which
was maintained regularly and covered continuity and
recovery issues, so they did not need separate plans. In
this case, the system owner was responsible for
updating of the documentation also after incidents, so
there was an incentive to keep it up to date, otherwise,
people would call the system owner whenever there
was a problem.
IT team or department, sometimes in cooperation
with middle (departmental) managers, often did the
plans themselves. The continuity plans made by
departments were not perfect in the beginning: “It is
worth being a realist, and this is organizational
learning. Just like in any other learning, such as when
small schoolchildren do their first crafts project, it is
rarely good. That is not the point; the point is just to do
one. Then you do a second [one], and another and
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your skills improve all the time. So I think this same
analogy applies to risk analysis and continuity plans.”
[C, p.6]
The role of top management was vital for planning.
If they had not required planning, plans were not
written. If the management was interested in
continuity, then the maintenance of the plans would be
regular. One interviewee from the healthcare sector
told that since the organization discussed and reported
all medical incidents and near-misses into software for
organizational learning purposes. Recently, they had
acquired an extension to the system to report also ISsec
related incidents and near-misses. The idea was not to
blame anyone, but discussion in order to learn and
improve processes. Incident-centered reporting was
common in other organizations too, but not all
organizations required regular reporting for top
management.
Although IT department and experts carried the
major workload of continuity planning and risk
analysis, top management support was influential and
middle management occasionally participated in
creating the plans. In prior literature, planning was an
important opportunity to create BCM awareness and
commitment among employees and managers [25, 29].
Thus, the embeddedness of BCM practices was not
probably improved in these organizations, since other
stakeholder groups had minimal part in the planning
phase.
Since many organizations had outsourced their IT
services partially or fully, sometimes all IT team could
do was to communicate situation to users via the
intranet, emails and text messages. Quick
communication and guidance of users to check
common information sources when they noticed
problems ensured that “the investigating experts have
a peaceful working situation. They are working
feverishly and most often there are more than one
party [investigating]: there might be network
operators, software developer companies, [office]’s
people and experts from the [system] owner.” [A, p.6]
Communication between organization and external
service providers was, as already mentioned,
sometimes a “headache”, since all parties avoided
responsibility.
This kind of inter-organizational investigation
required efficient communication processes.
Interviewees often had clear communication plans for
IT incident situations, but since they were in the public
sector and had legal requirements also for large crises,
the experiences from exercises had shown that
sometimes they might need megaphones or other
analog means for communicating. “We had a
simulated situation that a train carrying gas had
exploded […] and there was a power cut […] and then
we tried to figure out how to communicate, since you
could not use any electric equipment and we thought
where can we get megaphones and generators.” [E,
p.5]
Escalating risks made top management interested,
since then a possibility of reputation damage increased.
When larger crises were imaginable, IT managers
informed top management and were ready to contact
communications department to manage the external
communication to the media. Department heads and
other middle management were contacted if affected,
for example, when dependencies between different
systems were noticed. Therefore, it seems that
communication processes were quite effective and if
some problems had been experienced before, they had
learned their lessons and improved their processes.
Communicating to all possible stakeholder groups was
the responsibility of IT experts, but in crisis situations
top management would be facing the cameras.
As already mentioned above, training was focused
on ISsec and not on continuity management. This was
provided for users, but in these interviews the
systematic training of middle or senior management
was not mentioned. However, we can consider the
previous example of involving department managers
yearly in improving continuity plans as some kind of
training. Perhaps interviewees also believed that
reporting of continuity issues educates the senior
management in such extent that more training is not
necessary.
Testing was mainly a task for IT experts,
occasionally in co-operation with external service
providers. A recurring theme when discussing testing
of IT services was that interviewees seemed to quickly
admit that they have not done a full testing, when
asked about the testing of continuity plans. “The
recovery tests have been done before new systems are
implemented [in production environment]. […] But
such catastrophe tests, to suddenly pull the [power]
plug out from some datacenter, we haven’t had the
courage yet [for that].” [P, p.11] This same answer
was repeated so often that we started to wonder how
had they got an idea for full testing being the norm,
since it was clearly not.
One interviewee explained that they had an external
audit for their own continuity management system that
declared multiple small improvement areas. Only then
they understood that a full testing in their data center
would be beneficial. The external audit company was
responsible also for planning the test due later that
year. They used regular partial tests for certain
processes and were able to switch to their second data
center without any client-facing problems for a long
time. This narrative led us to conclude that external
auditors recommended these full tests. However, based
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on this data set, we cannot know whether all clients are
encouraged to do a full test, since the scope of testing
is dependent on organizational environment and their
expected service quality.
We also discussed the testing of back-up recovery.
Since recovery from back-ups was rather frequent
activity, many interviewees did not see the point of
further testing. Back-up recovery however did create
awareness of this basic BCM practice, back-ups, at all
levels of the organization.
Testing is also a BCM practice that could be used
for creating awareness and commitment for BCM in all
stakeholder groups [29]. This opportunity is missed in
the studied organizations, but back-up recovery, which
was discussed in the same context during interviews,
could have similar effect on users.
The reporting of continuity issues, as already
mentioned, was incident-centered in most
organizations and involved top and middle
management internally. IT management regularly
received reports from service providers. Therefore,
reporting involved all the necessary stakeholder
groups.
5. Conclusions
This paper set out to understand how managers
responsible for BCM see the roles of different
stakeholders in BCM practices in public sector. We
extended the prior literature by finding the stakeholders
and BCM practices from the interviews of managers
responsible of BCM of IT services in 16 organizations.
A comprehensive study on all relevant stakeholder
groups according to managers responsible of BCM has
not been published before to best of our knowledge
[see also 22]. We identified five different stakeholder
groups, which had some kind of central role in BCM
practices (see table 3). In addition to these, the
interviewees from public sector also discussed legal
requirements and laws, but since the laws were specific
to Finland, we decided not to discuss them in more
detail. Since the interviewees were mostly from IT
department, the role of IT experts as actors is
emphasized in the results.  Also the role of external
service providers was evident, since most of the
represented organizations had either partially or fully
outsourced their IT services, including development
and maintenance. The role of internal stakeholders was
not so significant as actors, but their assistance was
sometimes needed, support was welcomed and
occasionally, in interruptions, they had to be informed.
Contrary to prior literature [29], the IT managers
did not emphasize continuity culture or general BCM
awareness among users, which leads us to rethink users
as a significant stakeholder group. In the age of
information overload it seems perhaps an utopian
dream that end-users would be concerned about
continuity. As long as the IT services work, users do
regular back-ups and they know who to contact in
disruption situations and understand the impact of
information security policy compliance, the need for
raising awareness of continuity issues for all users
might be unnecessary.
Table 3. Stakeholder roles in continuity management practices
Practices Top management Middle
management
IT experts Users External
service
providers
Risk analyses Sometimes
discussing in
taskforces
Executing Sometimes
executing
Continuity
planning and plan
maintenance
Support or not Sometimes
executing
Executing Sometimes
executing
Communication in
crises
Towards media if
larger incident
and possible risk
to reputation
Informed if
effects to their
operations
Towards users,
management
and service
providers
Informing about
incidents and
reading informa-
tion about them
Towards IT
experts
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The role of top and middle management has been
recognized in prior literature, at least in the private
sector [9, 15]. Contrary to prior research [15], middle
management was not as involved in BCM planning as
they should have been, and some were also not keen to
take responsibility of continuity issues at all. IT
managers require support also from department heads
and other middle management to understand the
business impacts of different systems. Taskforces,
where continuity incidents and issues are discussed,
could be suitable arenas for engaging middle
management in BCM. Prior literature has noticed that
if IT management initiates the BCM project in an
organization, the commitment of others might be hard
to gain, at least in the private sector [25]. Although this
data set did not reveal this kind of behavior, some
commitment issues were observed in middle
management.
One interesting finding was also that IT team
seemed to have such a meaning for IT managers that
they might disregard BCM planning totally. Similar
findings have been reported in small, private sector
companies [25]. However, this strategy might not be
advisable in the public sector, especially if they have
legal obligations to public.
Based on our analysis, in addition to top
management and IT experts themselves, middle
managers and external service providers have a central
role in BCM practices. Since external service providers
are most often bound by formal contracts and financial
arrangements, their interest towards BCM is quite
assured. Yet, the commitment problems of middle
management in some organizations and the benefits of
their involvement in taskforces suggest that more effort
in engaging middle managers in BCM is needed.
Second contribution of this paper is that this study
represents public sector organizations, which have
been rather neglected in the BCM literature, although
the crisis, disaster and incident management studies are
more common. Laws required preparedness for crises
from these public organizations, but the daily
operations had also smaller incidents to manage for
which many had prepared with different practices.
Third contribution is practical. Involving
management to BCM practices, such as planning,
testing and training creates awareness of BCM, which
has not been the case in these organizations. It can be
exhausting task to “sell” BCM without support from
other members in the organization, at least until some
major disruption happens. Therefore, it is highly
recommended to start embedding BCM practices into
organizations, since it also affects the perceived
business impacts [15, 17, 29].
There were several limitations in this study. First, it
was conducted in Finland and thus generalizability of
results to other countries require further study. Second,
there was only one representative from all but one
target organization, and although they were responsible
for BCM, their viewpoint is rather limited. Therefore, a
study involving several stakeholder groups from each
organization would validate these findings. Third,
methodologically an interview has its limits, and it can
be argued whether the interviewees gave an objective
account. In this study, we try to see these interviews as
peaking holes into those organizations and
interviewees, not take them as facts, which would need
more data to be credible.
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